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Abstract
Recent research studying the link between law and  evidence  showing that firm-level  corporate governance
finance has concentrated  on  country-level  investor  provisions matter more in countries with weak legal
protection measures  and focused  on differences  in legal  environments.  These results suggest that firms can
systems across countries and legal families. Klapper and  partially compensate  for ineffective  laws and
Love extend  this literature and provide a study of firm-  enforcement  by establishing good corporate  governance
level corporate governance  practices  across emerging  and providing credible investor protection.  The authors'
markets and a greater understanding of the environments  tests also show that firm-level  governance  and
under which corporate governance  matters more.  Their  performance is lower in countries with weak legal
empirical  tests show that better corporate governance  is  environments,  suggesting that improving the legal system
highly correlated with better operating performance  and  should  remain a priority for policymakers.
market valuation.  More important,  the authors provide
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Previous research studying the link between law and finance has concentrated  on
corporate  governance around the world, focusing on differences in legal  systems across
countries and legal families.  This rapidly developing body of literature began with the
finding that the laws that protect investors differ significantly across countries,  in part
because of differences in legal origins (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer and Vishny
(1998).  Recent literature finds that cross-country differences  in laws and their enforcement
affect ownership structure, dividend payout, availability and cost of external finance and
market valuations.'
However, many provisions in investor protection laws may not be binding since
firms have the flexibility in their corporate  charters and bylaws to either choose to "opt-
out" and decline a specific  provision or adopt additional provisions not listed in the legal
code (see Easterbrook  and Fischel (1991), Black and Gilson (1998)). It is likely, therefore,
that not all firms in the same country offer the same degree of protection to their investors.
This raises the following questions that we explore: Do differences in investor protection
across firms within the same country matter? Can a firm that is "stuck" in a country with a
weak legal environment distinguish itself and afford more protection to its investors by
adopting good corporate governance practices, such as greater firm disclosure and stronger
minority shareholder rights? Finally, does the adoption of good corporate governance
practices  matter more in countries  with overall good or bad legal systems?
' For example,  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer and Vishny (1999a,  1999b, 2000),  Claessens, Djankov
and Lang (2000), Berkowitz,  Pistor and Richard (2002), Lombardo  and Pagano (2000), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (2001)  and others.
2Most existing literature using firm-level corporate governance provisions has
studied exclusively US and OECD firms (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Maher and
Andersson (2000) for comprehensive surveys).  For example, a recent paper by Gompers,
Ishi and Metrick (2001) uses differences  in takeover defense provisions to create a
corporate  governance index of US firms and finds that firms with stronger shareholder
rights have better operating performance, higher market valuation, and are more likely to
make acquisitions.  An exception is Black (2000), which finds that the governance
practices of Russian corporations  are strongly related to implied value ratios. However, a
remaining gap in the literature -- that our paper attempts to fill --is a study of firm-level
corporate governance practices across emerging markets and a greater understanding of the
environments under which corporate governance matters more.
In a recent report,  Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (further referred as CLSA)
produced corporate governance rankings for 495 firms across 25 emerging markets and 18
sectors.2 The descriptive statistics presented in the report show that companies ranked high
on the governance  index have better operating performance and higher stock returns. We
use the governance rankings produced by CLSA to further investigate the relationship
between governance and performance using multivariate regression analysis.  Unlike the
CLSA report that concentrates on returns, we use Tobin's-Q to measure the market
valuation of assets and return on assets (ROA) as a measure of operating performance. 3
2 Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, report titled "Saints and Sinners: Who's got religion", April 2001.
3  We do not use  returns as a performance measure  for several reasons. The first reason is the extreme
volatility in returns over the last several years in emerging markets overall and particularly in Asia, which
constitutes 70% of our sample.  Second, even though the CLSA report suggests that firms with bad corporate
governance have lower returns than  better governed firms, the interpretation  of this finding has to rely on
market inefficiency arguments- instead of considering  poor governance as a source of risk (and therefore
requiring additional  compensation for this risk in the form of higher return -i.e. negative correlation between
governance and performance)  investors underestimate the degree of agency costs resulting  from poor
3We find that better corporate  governance is associated with higher operating
performance  and higher Tobin's-Q. Not surprisingly, the country-average  governance
index is higher in countries with good overall legal systems. To ensure that the governance
index is not proxying for country-level variables we include country fixed effects and find
that the correlation with governance becomes twice as large and statistically more
significant.  This suggests that improvements  in governance relative to the country-average
are more important than the absolute value of the index.
We also explore the cross-country nature of our sample to study the correlation
between performance  measures and country-level  indicators of the legal system, such as
shareholder rights and the law enforcement index. We find that country-level  legal
efficiency  indices are not robust across specifications,  while the effect of the firm-level
governance index is always positive and significant.
Finally, we test whether good corporate governance matters more or less in
countries with weak shareholder protection and judicial efficiency.  One hypothesis is that
in a country with weak judicial efficiency, additional charter provisions would not be
enforced and therefore firms would be powerless to independently  improve investor
protection. In this case we should find that governance matters less in countries with weak
legal systems. An alternative hypothesis  is that in a country with a weak legal system,
investors would welcome even small improvements  in governance relative to other firms,
in which case we should find that good governance  matters more in a bad legal
environment.  We provide an empirical answer to this question by interacting the firm-level
governance practice which results  in lower returns  (i.e. positive correlation  between governance and
performance).  Gompers et al. (2001)  uses a similar argument to explain their results.
4corporate governance  index with measures of legal efficiency and shareholder rights. The
main contribution of this paper is our finding that good governance practices are more
important in countries with weak shareholder rights and inefficient enforcement.  This
finding has strong policy implications  and suggests that recommending to firms to adopt
good governance practices is even more important in countries with weak legal systems.
An important caveat of this study is the likely endogeneity of corporate  governance
practices.  For example, a growing firm with large needs for outside financing has more
incentive to adopt better governance practices in order to lower its cost of capital.  We test
this proposition by using the growth rate of sales as one of the determinants of governance
and find significantly positive correlation.  These growth opportunities  should also be
reflected in the market valuation of the firm, thus creating a positive correlation between
governance  and Tobin's-Q.4 Since our governance data have no time-variation we cannot
address the issue of causality directly and leave this issue for future research.  However,  we
attempt to mitigate this problem by adding several control variables that could proxy for
growth opportunities such as size, average  growth in sales and the rate of investment and
find that our governance results are not spuriously caused by these omitted variables.
An additional source of endogeneity  could arise as a result of the differences  in
proportion of intangible to fixed assets. For example, the composition of a firn's assets
will affect its contracting  environment because  it is easier to monitor and harder to steal
fixed assets (i.e. machinery and equipment) then "soft" capital (intangibles,  R&D capital,
and even some short-term assets, such as inventories).  Therefore, a firm operating with a
4  Similar endogeneity problem arises in  the studies of ownership and performance, as argued by
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) who propose panel data techniques and instrumental variables to
address this question.
5higher proportion of intangible assets may find it optimal to adopt stricter governance
mechanisms to prevent misuse of these assets.  We find support for this hypothesis using a
capital intensity measure, which is significantly negatively correlated with governance.  We
also include capital intensity as an additional control variable in our performance
regressions and the governance results remain significant.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the CLSA corporate governance
survey and summarizes our firm- and country-level data.  Section 3 discusses potential
endogeneity of governance and reports results on the determinants of corporate governance
behavior.  Section 4 reports our results, which include correlation tests between measures of
corporate governance and legality, Tobin's-Q and return on equity (ROE.)  Section 5
concludes.
2.  Data
The CLSA report contains CG ranking on 495 companies  in 25 countries.  The
CLSA sample is selected based on two criteria - firms' size and investor interest.  A recent
paper by Khanna et al (2001) uses this data to study convergence of corporate governance
practices across countries and confirms the sample selection criteria based on their detailed
study of India.
The corporate governance  (CG) ranking compiled by CLSA is a composite of 57
qualitative, binary (yes/no) questions, designed to avoid subjectivity.  Appendix  1 reports
an abbreviated version of the questionnaire.  Each question is constructed  such that answer
'Yes'  adds one point to the governance score. The analysts are given strict instructions to
answer negatively if they have any doubts or if  there was any unresolved controversy  over
6the minority shareholder rights. According to CLSA, about 70% of the questions are based
on objective facts and remaining questions represent analysts'  opinions. Unfortunately,
reliance on analysts' opinions worsens the endogeneity problem, as it is likely that analysts
could rely on past performance  to form their opinions.  This is likely to be worse for
regressions  including past returns and is one of the reasons why we do not study retums.
The questions cover seven broad categories: management discipline, transparency,
independence,  accountability,  responsibility, fairness and social awareness.  Our main
governance index,  further referred as GOV, is the sum of first six categories  and excludes
the social awareness category,  which is not relevant for corporate  governance  (although our
results are robust to inclusion of this category). Furthermore,  we do not study the
disaggregated indices,  since the categories  seem to overlap and are categorized with some
subjectivity.5 For example,  the distinction between the Independence  and Accountability
sections is imprecise and the Responsibility and Fairness sections both reflect minority
shareholder  rights (as are the questions 20 and 22 from the Independence  section).
In order to include firm-level accounting data, we merged the CLSA data with
Worldscope data (June 2001 CD-ROM).  To avoid the anomalous period of the Asian Crisis
we included only firms that had available accounting data beginning in at least  1998.6 We
started with 451 firms with non-missing accounting  data.7 After excluding 50 banks, 20
firms in Eastern Europe and China (excluded because of unavailable legal indices),  and 7
firms in countries with less than 3 firms each (Argentina,  Columbia, Greece and Mexico),
5 For example, question 28 could easily belong to the Independence  section,  questions  37 and 39 could
belong to the Discipline section, question 45 to Transparency  section etc.
6  Our sample contains 29 firms with 1998 as the last available  data. We include  in all regressions a dummy
for year  1998 to control for time effects.  The dummy is always negative and significant (it is not reported)
but does not affect the significance of our governance results.
7our sample was reduced to 374 firms in 14 countries - Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore,  South Africa, Taiwan,
Thailand, Turkey.8
The distribution of our GOV index across countries is shown in Table  1, Panel A.
Note that our sample is not equally distributed across countries  - 68% of firms are in East
Asia, 19% of firms are in South Asia, and 11% of firms are in Latin America.  Mean GOV
rankings overall are 54.16 and vary from a country average of 31.85 in Pakistan to 66.53 in
South Korea.  There is also great variation within countries - for example, the corporate
governance ranking of firms in Pakistan varies from 17.25 to 66.68.  These summary
statistics highlight the firm-specific differences  in corporate governance  practices even
within countries and families of legal origins.
We use two main performance measures:  Tobin's-Q as a measure of market
valuation of the firm and return on assets (ROA) as a measure of operating performance.9
Substituting other measures of operating performance - such as gross margin and return on
equity - give similar results. Summary statistics and sample distributions for Tobin's-Q and
ROA are given in Table 1, Panel B.  For 1999, the average Tobin's-Q is 2.09 and varies
from country-average  1.16 in Turkey to 3.67 in Taiwan.  The median Q (1.39) is slightly
higher then the median reported in other studies (for example La Porta et al. (1999))
7Since  a few variables are missing for some firms, the sample size varies slightly depending on the set of
included variables.
8  We further excluded firms with Tobin's Q above 10 (which excludes  17 firms  - slightly less than 5% of  the
sample) and firms with ROA above the 9 9 gh  and below the  Ist percentiles (6 firms). To use as many
observations as possible we exclude only Q outliers in Q regressions and ROA outliers in ROA regressions -
therefore the sample in ROA regressions  is slightly different  from the sample in Q regressions.  In addition
some of the control variables are missing for some observations which further causes slight variation  in the
sample size across regressions.
9  Tobin's-Q is defined as the market value of assets (calculated  as book value of assets minus book value of
equity plus market value of equity) over book value of assets, and return on assets (ROA)  is defined as net
income over total assets.
8reflecting the overall  good performance of the global economy in 1999. The standard
deviation is 1.68, reflecting the significant variation in performance across firms.  The
country-average ROA is 0.08, with the highest average performance of 0.11 in India and
the lowest performance of 0.01  in Brazil.
We add three country-level  measures of legal efficacy.  The first is Judicial
Efficiency, which is an index constructed by the International Country Risk Guide (2000).
The second is Shareholder Rights, which is the sum of dummies identifying one-share/one-
vote, proxy by mail, unblocked shares, cumulative vote/proportional representation,
preemptive rights, oppressed minority, and % of shares needed to call a shareholders
meeting (La Porta et al.,  1998.)  The third is Legality, which is an index of legal system and
institutional environment constructed as a weighted average of Judicial Efficiency (same as
our first index), Rule of Law, Corruption, Risk of Expropriation, and Risk of Contract
Repudiation  (this index is constructed using principal components analysis by Berkowitz,
Pistor and Richard, 2002).  We use three different measures in order to cover separately the
existence of laws (Shareholder Rights) and the effectiveness  of their implementation
(Judicial Efficiency), as well as the overall legal environment (Legality.)
Summary statistics and sample distributions for the legal indicators are given in
Table 1, Panel C.  The average Judicial Efficiency  is 13.88 (out of 20), the average
Shareholder Rights is 3.57 (out of 5), and the average Legality is 6.30 (out of 10.)  There is
large variation across countries, emphasizing  regional and global difference in the quality
and effectiveness of laws around the world.
93. Determinants of Governance
3. 1. Hypotheses
As discussed in the introduction, corporate  governance is likely to be endogenously
determined. In this section we discuss variables that in theory could be associated with
firms adopting better governance mechanisms and present empirical results in support of
these theories. We deliberately do not include any performance-related  measures as
governance determinants  as we will study governance-performance  relationships in the
next section. Recognizing the endogeneity of the governance,  we can only interpret all our
results as partial correlations.  However, the exercise in this section helps us better
understand the potential sources of this endogeneity.
The arguments below follow closely Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) who
argued that the level of managerial  ownership is endogenously determined by the firm's
contracting environment and therefore could spuriously pick up the effect of this
unobserved heterogeneity in the ownership-performance  regressions. As managerial
ownership is only one of the governance  mechanisms, the arguments could easily be
transferred to other mechanisms  such managerial  compensation, board structure, disclosure
and other minority shareholder protections, which are combined into our governance index.
We consider several sources of the variation in contracting  environments.  The most
obvious is the overall country-level  measure of shareholder rights and their enforcement.  If
a country's laws offer weak shareholder protection it might be costly for firms to adopt
different provisions in their corporate charters because it will be difficult for investors and
judges to understand non-standard  contracts, as argued by La Porta et al. (1998). Therefore,
firms in countries with overall weak legal environments may not have much flexibility to
10improve their investor protection and may therefore have lower corporate governance
indices, on average. In the extreme case, for example, firms would be completely powerless
to change the overall legal environment with internal governance  mechanisms.10 However,
our finding that there is substantial variation in the governance indicators within countries
and that governance is significantly correlated with performance  after controlling for
country effects (as discussed in section 4) implies that firms are not completely powerless
and do have some flexibility to improve their governance mechanisms.
In addition to country-level  differences in legal efficiency, it is likely that there will
be variation across firms within contracting environments,  a point proposed by
Himmelberg et al. (1999) and further developed by Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love
(2001). For example, the composition of a firm's assets will affect its contracting
environment because it is easier to monitor and harder to steal fixed assets (i.e. machinery
and equipment) then "soft" capital (intangibles, R&D capital, and even some short-term
assets, such as inventories). Therefore,  a firm operating with a higher proportion of
intangible assets may find it optimal to adopt stricter governance mechanisms to prevent
misuse of these assets, i.e. we should observe negative correlation between the proportion
of fixed assets and governance.  It is important to keep this relationship in mind while
estimating the effect of governance on performance, since the level of intangibles may
result in higher Q since in general, the market values intangibles higher then their book
value.  Similarly, operating performance should be higher since the denominator  (for
example, total assets) does not fully account for all intangibles. In our performance
10 In another extreme, if the firm could completely "overwrite" the legal code in  their own contracts, we
would observe better governance in  countries with bad legal system as these firms will be more in "need" of
11regressions we control for asset composition and find that the effect of governance on
performance  is not driven by this source of heterogeneity.  We use fixed capital (i.e.
property plant and equipment) to total sales ratio, denoted K/S, as a measure of the relative
importance of fixed capital  in the firm's output."
Another  source of endogeneity  could arise because of differences in unobserved
growth opportunities. Firms with good growth opportunities will need to expand and raise
external financing and may therefore  find it optimal to improve their governance
mechanisms as better governance and better minority shareholder protection will likely to
lower their cost of cost of capital.'2 If Tobin's-Q is higher for firms with good growth
opportunities, this could also be a cause of endogeneity of governance in the performance
regressions and result in positive spurious correlations  with governance. Unfortunately
there is no good measure of the growth opportunities besides Tobin's-Q. As an arguably
imperfect measure, we use average real growth rate in sales for the last 3 years, denoted
SalesGR,  as a proxy for future growth (and growth opportunities).1 3
Finally, we also explore the effects of differences  in firm size on governance.  The
effect of size is ambiguous as large firms may have greater agency problems (because it is
harder to monitor them or because of the "free cash flows" argument of Jensen (1986)) and
therefore need stricter governance  mechanisms to compensate.  Alternatively,  small firrms
good governance mechanisms  to compensate  for their bad legal system. However, if the enforcement  of
contracts is weak, the firm will not be able to do that as is  the fact that the legal system does matter.
" Himmelberg et al. (1999) also use research and development intensity (R&D) and advertising expenses as
additional measures of the "intangibility" of the assets. Unfortunately, the Worldscope database  does not
provide variables with advertising expenses and the R&D data is unavailable for most firms in our sample.
2 See La Porta et. al. (1999a),  Lombardo and Pagano (2000) and Himmelberg, Hubbard  and Love (2001)
among others on the relationship between investor protection and the cost of capital.
'3 Past growth rates will be correlated  with future growth if there are investment adjustment costs, "time to
build" (i.e. it takes several periods to make new investment  fully operational), or if the shocks to productivity
are serially correlated.
12may have better growth opportunities and, as implied by the argument above, greater need
for external finance and better governance mechanisms.  For this reason we also use size as
a control variables in the Tobin's-Q regressions.  We use the natural log of sales (in US$) as
a measure of firm size.
To summarize, our model to study governance determinants  is given by:
GOVy=,  Log(Sales)f + /2  SalesGrf +fJ3  K/Sf +/34 LegalSystem,  +r
As previously implied, we expect /2  >0, 63<0, /4>0,  and /1  is ambiguous. We have three
different country-level indicators for the Legal System: the laws on the book (Shareholder
Rights) and the effectiveness of their implementation (Judicial Efficiency), as well as the
overall legal environment (Legality).  Since Efficiency and Legality measures are two
different indicators of the quality of the law enforcement,  we do not include them together,
but we include shareholder rights in combinations with either Efficiency or Legality.
3.2 Evidence
Table 2 reports our estimates of the governance determinants,  which find all  signs
consistent with our hypotheses.  In Column  1 we only include our 3 firm-level variables--
size is positive and marginally significant, while average  growth rate and capital intensity
are significant at  1%. However, the explanatory power of this regression is low, with an
adjusted R2 of only 0.06. In Columns 2 and 3 we include country-level measures of the
legal environment:  Shareholder rights paired with either Efficiency or Legality and we find
the coefficients of these variables positive and significant. These regressions generate much
larger R2, which explain about  13% in the regression with Efficiency and 22% in the
13regression with Legality. Thus, we can conclude that firms in countries with weak overall
legal system on average have lower governance  rankings. 14
In Columns 4 and 5 we include both firm-level  and country-level variables together
and find that sales growth, capital  intensity and both measures of enforcement remain
significant while size and shareholder rights become  insignificant at conventional levels
(size becomes insignificant in Column 4 and shareholder rights in Column 5). Finally,
instead of country-level  legal indicators we run a regression with country dummies in
model 6 and find that capital intensity and growth rates are still significant while size is not.
The R2 in this model is much larger,  implying that unobserved country effects account for
large differences  in the variation in governance  rankings. However,  over 60% of this
variation is not explained by country effects, suggesting that firms have enough flexibility
to affect their corporate  governance  and investor protection.
To summarize, we find that (1)  firms in countries with weak overall legal systems
on average have lower governance rankings; (2) past growth rates are positively associated
with good governance;  and (3) firms with higher proportion of fixed assets have lower
governance.  We also find that size has a marginally positive effect on governance. These
results confirm our intuition of the endogeneity of governance and emphasize that it is
important to control for these factors in our performance regressions to ensure that the
governance effect on performance is not spuriously caused by any of these omitted
factors.'5
14 The coefficients from the  regression of governance  on efficiency index alone (not reported) imply that an
increase  in efficiency from the country with the lowest efficiency  (Indonesia) to the country with the median
efficiency (South Africa) results in an improvement  in average governance ranking of 7.7, or about half a
standard deviation.
'5 The ability to control  for these factors  is the advantage of our multivariate regression analysis over the
descriptive statistics  methodology used in the original CLSA report.
144. Governance and Performance
4. 1. Hypotheses
In this section we study the relationship between firm-level governance, country-
level legal environment and firms performance.  Our first hypothesis tests the correlation
between firm governance and equity valuation:
QJ= a+  /3J(Govf)  + X
where Govf equals the firm-level  corporate governance ranking.  This tests whether
investors reward good corporate governance.  To test the robustness of this relationship we
sequentially add 1-digit industry dummies, country dummies and other firm-level control
variables discussed in section 3. We then repeat the same exercise using ROA as an
alternative performance  measure.
Second, we test whether the country-level  legal environment has influence on
market and operating performance and whether firm-level governance is important after
controlling for country-level  legal efficiency. Regardless of individual firm-level investor
protection, firms are also subject to country-level  regulatory and legal environments that
differ in laws and enforcement.'6 Legal environments have been shown to be related to
firm performance  on the international, country, and state levels (Lombardo and Pagano
(2000), La Porta et al. (1999), Daines (2001), respectively).  First, block shareholders are
more likely to exploit minority shareholders  in countries that have weaker protection of
minority shareholders.  Second, firm-level protection of minority rights is less likely to be
effective if legal enforcement and judicial efficiency is weak. We address this concern by
first replacing  the firm-level  governance index in our model with country-level  legal
15indicators and secondly including the two measures simultaneously to test for their relative
importance.
Our third hypothesis tests the effect of the  interaction of corporate  governance and
judicial efficiency on firm valuation.  We include in this regression:
Qf = a + /3j(Govj)  + /32(Eff)  + /63(Govy*Effdf + y
where Gov equals the firm-level corporate governance  ranking; Eff. equals the country-
level judicial efficiency;  and (Gov*Ef])j equals the interaction.  We interpret the interaction
term to identify whether corporate governance matters more or less in countries with weak
legal enforcement.  For example,  in countries with weak  law enforcement the adoption of
firm-specific governance-related  provisions could be less effective then in countries with
good enforcement (because the provisions are not enforceable  and additional mechanisms
such as independent board of directors or audit committees will be powerless to discipline
the insiders).  Therefore,  we could find that governance  matters less in countries with weak
legal system.  Alternatively, we may find that investors will reward more a firm that
establishes good corporate  governance framework  in countries with poor overall minority
shareholder protection,  as even a little bit of improvement relative to other firms in a
country will make a big difference  for investors, which will improve market valuation and
decrease the cost of capital (and subsequently  operating performance.)
Another explanation for our finding of a  negative interaction effect  is suggested in
a recent paper by Doidge, Karolyi  and Stulz (2001). They argue that controlling
shareholders have more incentives to expropriate the minority shareholders  in countries
with less investor protection, and therefore the agency costs in countries with weaker rule
16 Dimitrov (2001)  shows that firms in countries  with weak legal environments  are less likely to have
16of law are greater. By establishing good governance mechanisms,  the controlling
shareholders give up more of their benefits of control in countries where such benefits are
high (i.e. investor protection  is low), which will be reflected in the firm's performance and
market valuation.
4.2 Evidence
Table 3 reports our first set of OLS univariate and multivariate regressions.  In
Panel A, the first column shows a univariate test with Tobin's-Q as the dependent
variable.'7 We find that Tobin's-Q and governance are significantly, positively correlated.
This supports our hypothesis that firms with better corporate  governance have higher
market valuation.  Columns 2 and 3 show that this result is robust to the inclusion of
country and 1-digit SIC code dummies.  It is important to note that the governance
coefficient doubles and becomes more significant after including country dummies, which
suggests that relative governance (i.e.  relative to the country average)  is more important
than the absolute value of the index.  The magnitude of this effect is large, as one  standard
deviation change in governance  results in about a 23% increase  in the value of Tobin's-Q.
To test whether this relationship could be spuriously caused by some omitted
variables we add the variables that we found in section 3 to be associated with higher
governance rankings. Column 4 shows that our result is  robust to the inclusion of log sales,
which suggests that the relationship between good governance and market valuation holds
regardless of firm size.  Column 5 adds the average growth rate of real sales,  SalesGR,
independent directors, since firms are unable to show credible commitment not to expropriate.
17 All regressions  include a  1998 year dummy to indicate 29 firms whose last year of data is  1998.
17which is significantly positive, in line with our intuition discussed in section 3 as past sales
growth is likely to be correlated with future growth opportunities and therefore increases
market valuation.  Column 6 adds our measure of capital intensity, K/S, which is
significantly negative, suggesting that firms with more intangible assets (i.e. lower capital
intensity) have higher Tobin's-Q. However, governance  is robust to the inclusion of these
additional controls, which makes us confident that the relationship is not spuriously caused
by any of the omitted variables.'8
Table 3, Panel B also shows a similar positive correlation between corporate
governance behavior and firm performance, as estimated by ROA. These results are
consistent with results found in Gompers et al. (2001), which find that firms in the US with
weaker corporate  governance have relatively lower profits.  However, ours is the first
evidence  that a relationship  between corporate  governance and firm performance holds in
emerging markets,  which unlike the US is categorized by more concentrated ownership and
weaker legal environments.
Table 4 extends the previous regressions to include the effect of legal indicators,
with Tobin's-Q as the dependent variable.  We include three measures of legal performance:
Panel A includes Judicial Efficiency, which indicates the implementation of laws; Panel B
includes Shareholders Rights, which indicates the existence of laws protecting investors;
and Panel C includes Legality, which is an overall measure of the legal environment.
Table 4, Column  1 shows univariate tests of Tobin's-Q  and legal indicators  (all
regressions  include  1-digit SIC code and yearl998 dummies.)  We find only a significant
1s The results are unchanged when we add all three additional controls  simultaneously (not reported, available
on request)-  governance  and all control variables remain significant at 1%  level. We have also experimented
18correlation with Legality,  which is the broadest measure of a good legal environment.
However,  when we add the interaction with governance  in column 4 we find that all three
legal indicators are significant at 10%.19  Column 2 shows that good corporate governance
continues to be significantly related to valuation, even after correcting for the legal
environment.  This suggests that even though our governance measure is significantly
correlated with country-level  legal indicators  (as shown in section 3), firn-specific
governance  measures  are of greater importance than the constraints of country-level  laws
in determining market valuation.
In Table 4, Column 3 we  test whether governance  is more or less important in
countries with better legal systems  by including the interaction of firm-level  governance
and a measure of country-level  legal efficiency.  We find that this interaction is  negative,
which indicates that governance  is even more important in countries with overall weak
legal systems.20 In Column 3 the interaction is only significant for the measure of Judicial
Efficiency.  However, when we include the Latin dummy in Column 4 the interaction
becomes significant for all three legal indicators (significant at 1% for Efficiency  and 10%
for Shareholder Rights and Legality).  We suggest that the 2 Latin American countries in
our sample (Chile and Brazil) are different from the rest of the sample because they have
the lowest mean and median  Q in the sample (except for Turkey) and relatively low ROA,
however they have relatively strong governance  indicators. This could be because  in late
with Investment to Assets ratio as another proxy for the future growth opportunities.  It was never significant
and did not affect our governance results.
'9 This is consistent with La Porta, et al (2002) that finds evidence  in 27 high-income  countries that firms with
better protection of minority shareholders  have higher market valuation.
20 Because the interaction term treats governance and legality as symmetric  variables,  an alternative
interpretation  of our empirical tests is  that a good legal environment matters more for firms with weak firm-
level governance.  In other words, firms with weak governance have to rely more on the legal system to
uphold the investor's rights while well-governed firms  are less dependent on the legal system.
191999 firms trading ADRs on US exchanges were required to improve disclosure and
minority shareholder protection.21  In addition, in 2000 the governments of Brazil  and Chile
22 both enacted new laws offering greater protection to minority shareholders.  We suggest
that although the corporate governance rankings reflect required improvements  in
disclosure and minority rights, they would not be correlated with 1999 data.  We also
obtain similar results (i.e. all legal indicators are significant at least at 10%) when we
exclude these 2 Latin American countries  from our regressions.  Our finding of the negative
interaction effects parallels that of Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2001)  who find that the
premium associated with ADR issuance is larger for firms in countries with weaker
investor protection.
Table 5 reproduces these results with ROA as the dependent variable.  With the
exception of the results including Shareholder Rights, we find a strong correlation between
governance and ROA, and a significantly negative correlation with the interaction  of
judicial effectiveness.23 The weaker results of Shareholder Rights could reflect the smaller
variation within this variables as well as the possible weaker importance of actual laws
relative to their implementation.24
The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that firm-level investor protection is more
important for firm valuation in countries with weaker investor protection from the courts.
21  We find in  multivariate tests that firms that list ADRs have higher corporate governance rankings (not
shown),  which may reflect the mandatory reporting and disclosure requirements of US exchanges.
22 This includes  "Rule 345" in  Brazil and the OPA law in  Chile, which protect minority shareholders during
acquisitions,  and the Corporate  Law bill in  Brazil which provide broad protections to minority shareholders.
23  The results in  Table 4 are robust to the substitution of ROA with Gross Margen, which is  defined as EBIT
divided by total sales.
24 The important caveat for our interaction results is  the small sample -14 countries may not be enough to
properly test this hypothesis.  We therefore should be cautious in attaching strong interpretations to these
results.
20In  terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation improvement in governance increases
Tobin's-Q by 33% of its standard deviation if the Efficiency score is 5, and improves
Tobin's-Q by 18% of its standard deviation if the Efficiency score is 8.  Although an
improvement in firm-level governance  always improves performance and market valuation,
the improvements are higher in countries with weaker legal and judicial infrastructures.
5. Conclusion
Although it is well established that firm-level and country-level  shareholder
rights and judicial efficiency affects firm value (Gompers et al. (2001), La Porta, et al.,
1998, 2001, etc., Lombardo  and Pagamo,  1998),  we address in this paper the question of
under what country-level  conditions does good corporate governance matter more.  We
find that firm-level corporate governance matters more in countries with weak shareholder
protection and poor judicial efficiency.
We use data from a recent report by Credit Lyonnais  Securities Asia (CLSA) that
produced corporate governance  rankings for 495 firms across 25 emerging markets and  18
sectors. Our empirical tests show that better corporate governance is highly correlated with
better operating performance  and market valuation, as measured by ROA and Tobin's-Q,
respectively.  We also find that firm-level  governance is correlated with variables related to
the extent of the asymmetric information and contracting  imperfections that the firm faces,
which we proxy with firm size, sales growth (proxy for the growth opportunities) and
intangibility of assets. However, the governance-performance  relationship is robust to the
addition of these control variables.
25 In alternative  specifications  (not shown) we include GDP per capita to distinguish between financial and
21Our results suggest that firms in countries with poor investor protection can use
provisions in their charters to improve their corporate governance, which may improve
their performance and valuation.  However, our results do not attempt to imply that firm-
level corporate governance  is a replacement for country-level judicial reform.  For
example, we also find that firms on average have significantly lower governance rankings
in countries with weak legal systems, which suggests that firms cannot completely
compensate for the absence of strong laws and good enforcement.  These results support the
theoretical findings in Shleifer and Wolfensohn (2002) that firms are unable to completely
replicate a good legal environment on their own, but must depend on a supporting efficient
judicial  system. We find that firms can independently  improve their investor protection and
minority shareholder rights, to a certain degree, but that this adjustment mechanism is a
second best solution and does not fully substitute for the absence of a good legal
infrastructure.
Our results also have important policy implications.  Although the task of reforming
investor protection laws and improving judicial quality is difficult, lengthy, and requires
the support of politicians and other interest groups,  improving corporate governance  on a
firm-level is a feasible goal.  Our results suggest that even prior to legal and judicial
reform, firms can still reduce their cost of capital by establishing credible investor
protection provisions.  Our paper proposes that firms in countries with poor investor
protection  can use provisions in their charters to improve their corporate governance,
which  may improve their performance and valuation.  However,  the task of reforming the
legal systems should remain a priority on the policymaker's  agenda.
legal  development . Our results are robust and we find that GDP per capita is not significant
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24Appendix  1: Abbreviated CLSA questionnaire.
Discipline  (15%)26
1  . Has the company  issued a "mission statement"  that explicitly places a priority on good corporate govemance
<  . >279
2.  Is senior management  incentivised to work towards a higher share price for the company eg, <...>  expected
remuneration  for the top executive(s)  is tied to the value of the shares?
3.  Does management  stick to clearly  defined core businesses? (Any diversification into an unrelated  area in last 3
years would count  as "No".)
4.  <...> Is management's view of its cost of equity within  10% of a CAPM derived estimate?
5.  < ...> Is management's estimate of its cost of capital  within  10% of our estimate based on its capital structure?
6.  Over the past 5 years, is it true that the Company  has not issued equity,  or warrants for new equity, for
acquisitions  and/or financing new projects where there was any controversy  over whether the acquisition/project  was
financially sound? <...>
7.  Does senior management  use debt for investments/capex  only where ROA (or average ROI) is clearly higher
than cost of debt and where interest cover is no less than 2.5x? <...>
8.  Over the past 5 years, is it true that the company has not built up cash levels <...> ?
9.  Does the company's  Annual Report include a section devoted to the company's performance  in implementing
corporate  govemance principles?
Transparency (15%)
10.  Has management disclosed three- or five-year ROA or ROE targets?  <  ...  >
11.  Does the company publish its Annual Report within four months of the end of the financial year?
12.  Does the company publish/announce  semiannual reports within two months of the end of the half-year?
13.  Does the company publish/announce  quarterly reports within two months of the end of  the quarter?
14.  Has the public  announcement  of results  been no longer than two working days of the Board  meeting? < ...  >
15.  Are the reports clear and informative?  (Based  on perception of analyst.) <  ...  >
16.  Are  accounts presented according to IGAAP? <  ...  >
17.  Does the company consistently  disclose major and market  sensitive information punctually?  <  ...  >
18.  Do analysts  have good access to senior management? Good access  implies accessibility  soon after results are
announced and timely meetings where analysts are given all relevant information  and are not misled.
19.  Does the Company have an English language  web-site where results and other announcements  are updated
promptly (no later than one business day)?
Independence  (15%)
20.  Is it true that there has been no  controversy or questions raised over whether the board and senior management
have made decisions  in the past five years that benefit them, at the expense of shareholders? (Any loans to group
companies/Vs, non-core/non-controlled  group-investments, would mean "No").
21.  Is the Chairman an independent, non-executive  director?
22.  Does the company have an executive  or management committee  <...> which is substantially different from
members of the Board and not believed to be dominated by major shareholders?  (ie, no more than half are also Board
members  and major shareholder  not perceived as dominating executive decision making.)
23.  Does the company have an audit committee? Is it chaired by a perceived  genuine independent director?
24.  Does the company  have a remuneration committee? Is it chaired by a perceived  genuine independent director?
25.  Does the company  have a nominating committee? Is it chaired by a perceived  genuine independent director?
26.  Are the extemal auditors of the company in other respects seen to be completely unrelated to the company?
27.  Does the board include no direct representatives  of banks and other large creditors of the company? (Having
any representatives  is a negative.)
Accountability  (15%)
28.  Are the board members  and members of the executive/management  committee substantially different <...>? (ie,
no more than half of one committee  sits on the other?)
26 Percents reflect the weight in the CLSA weighted average index.
27 We kept the wording of  the questions  exactly as specified in the CLSA report, however to save the space
and without loss of contents we cut out portions of the questions, these cuts are marked with <. ..> .For
example we removed all clarifications  as to how the analysts  should answer the questions  and endings such as
"as far as the analyst can tell".
2529.  Does the company have non-executive  directors who are demonstrably and  unquestionably independent?
(Independence of directors  must be demonstrated  by either being appointed through nomination of non-major
shareholders  or having on record voted on certain issues against the rest of the Board. <...>)
30.  Do independent,  non-executive  directors account for more than 50% of the Board?
31.  Are there any foreign nationals on the Board < ..  .> ?
32.  Are full Board meetings held at least once a quarter?
33.  Are Board members  well briefed before Board meetings? <...>(Answers 33-35 must be based on direct contact
with an independent Board member.  If no access is provided  <  ...> answer "No" to each question.)
34.  Does the audit committee  nominate and conduct a proper review  the work of extemal  auditors <...>?
35.  Does the audit committee  supervise intemal audit and accounting procedures <...> ?
Responsibility  (15%)
36.  If the Board/senior management have made decisions in recent years seen to benefit them at the expense of
shareholders (cf Q20 above), has the Company been seen as acting effectively against individuals responsible and
corrected such behavior promptly, ie, within 6 months? (If no such case, answer this question as "Yes".)
37.  < ...> Over the past five years,  if  there were  flagrant business failures or misdemeanors, were the persons
responsible appropriately and  voluntarily punished?  (If no cases < ...>  then answer  "No.")
38.  Is there any controversy or questions over whether the Board and/or senior management take measures to
safeguard the interests of all  and not just the dominant shareholders? < ...>
39.  Are there mechanisms to allow punishment of the executive/management  committee in the event of
mismanagement <...> ?
40.  Is it true that there have been no controversies/  questions over whether the share trading by Board members
have been fair,  fully transparent and well intentioned? <...>
41.  <...> Is the board small enough  to be efficient and effective? (If more than 12, answer  "No".)
Fairness (15%)
42.  Is it true that there have not been any controversy or questions  raised over any decisions by senior management
in the past 5 years  where majority shareholders  are believed to have gained at the expense of minority shareholders?
43.  Do all equity holders  have the right to call General Meetings? <...>
44.  Are voting methods easily accessible  (eg proxy voting)?
45.  Are all necessary <...> information  for General  Meetings made available  prior to General Meeting?
46.  Is senior management  unquestionably seen as trying to ensure fair value is reflected in the market price of the
stock <...> ?
47.  Is it true that there has been no questions or perceived  controversy  over whether the Company has
issued depositary receipts that benefited primarily major shareholders <...> ?
48.  Does the majority shareholder  group own less than 40% of the company?
49.  Do foreign portfolio  managers, and/or domestic portfolio  investors who have a track record in
engaging management on  CG issues,  own at least 20% of the total shares with voting rights?
50.  Does the head of Investor Relations report to either the CEO or a Board member?
51.  <  ...> Over the past five years, is it true that total directors remuneration  has not increased faster than net profit
after exceptionals ? <...>
Social awareness (10%)
52.  Does the company have an explicit (clearly worded)  public policy statements that emphasize  strict ethical
behavior:  ie, one that looks at the spirit and not just the letter of the law?
53.  Does the company have a policy/culture  that prohibits the employment of the under-aged  <  .. .> ?
54.  Does the company  have an explicit  equal employment policy < ...  > ?
55.  Does the Company adhere to  specified industry guidelines on sourcing of materials  <  ...  > ?
56.  Is the company  explicitly environmentally  conscious? < ...  >
57.  Is it true that the company has no investments  operations  in Myanmar?
26Table 1: Summary Statistics
Governance is CLSA's  firm-level  corporate governance  rankings.  Tobin's-Q is defined  as the market value
of equity plus total liabilities divided by total assets.  ROA  is a firm-level  measure of firm performance  and is
defined as net income plus interest expense divided by total assets. Legality is an index of legal and economic
development  constructed as a weighted average of Efficiency of the Judiciary, Rule of Law, Corruption, Risk
of Expropriation,  and Risk of Contract Repudiation.  (Berkowitz,  et al., 2002).  Shareholder Rights is the sum
of dummies identifying  one-share/one-vote,  proxy  by mail,  unblocked  shares,  cumulative  vote/proportional
representation,  preemptive rights, oppressed minority,  and % of shares needed to call an ESM (Shleifer, et al.,
1999).  Judicial  Efficiency is from the International Country Risk Guide (2000).
Panel A: Firm Level Corporate Governance Index
Obs  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Std Dev
All Sample  374  54.11  54.97  11.77  92.77  14.00
Brazil  24  57.26  59.87  43.08  68.22  7.99
Chile  13  61.63  60.62  48.22  69.25  5.18
Hong Kong  35  58.27  59.73  30.90  92.77  14.80
India  68  52.78  51.07  32.33  92.52  10.76
Indonesia  16  37.81  38.52  11.77  62.85  12.91
Malaysia  40  54.44  58.64  21.63  78.30  14.40
Pakistan  9  31.85  26.83  17.25  66.68  15.56
Philippines  17  40.72  34.08  19.40  64.35  13.66
Singapore  38  65.34  66.10  45.37  85.97  9.82
South Africa  32  66.53  67.16  42.62  80.38  8.55
South Korea  18  40.66  39.73  33.00  55.82  5.73
Taiwan  37  53.45  53.13  38.95  74.52  8.39
Thailand  18  53.54  49.69  28.33  79.02  14.53
Turkey  9  43.04  46.58  23.43  56.77  12.90
27Table 1: Summary Statistics (cont.)
Panel B: Firm Level Performance  Variables, 1999
Tobin's-Q:  ROA:
Obs  Mean  Median  Std Dev  Obs  Mean  Median  Std Dev
All Sample  336  2.09  1.39  1.68  357  0.08  0.06  0.16
Brazil  24  1.27  1.10  0.67  24  0.01  0.02  0.05
Chile  12  1.38  1.20  0.65  12  0.04  0.05  0.04
Hong Kong  29  1.95  1.37  1.67  33  0.09  0.06  0.09
India  55  2.82  1.66  2.26  66  0.11  0.09  0.08
Indonesia  16  2.23  1.89  1.28  16  0.10  0.08  0.10
Malaysia  39  1.84  1.45  1.06  39  0.10  0.08  0.08
Pakistan  9  1.49  1.46  0.47  9  0.06  0.09  0.11
Philippines  17  1.46  1.36  0.65  17  0.04  0.04  0.05
Singapore  35  1.73  1.19  1.37  37  0.05  0.04  0.05
South Africa  32  1.90  1.37  1.40  29  0.09  0.07  0.07
South Korea  16  1.58  1.09  1.32  16  0.03  0.02  0.04
Taiwan  30  3.67  3.12  2.31  31  0.10  0.07  0.07
Thailand  16  2.07  1.50  1.50  15  0.05  0.04  0.09
Turkey  6  1.16  1  .16  0.53  7  0.05  0.00  0.08
Panel C: Country-Level  Judicial Variables
Shareholder  Judicial Legality  Rights  Efficiency
All Sample  13.88  3.57  6.30
Brazil  14.07  3.00  5.75
Chile  14.68  5.00  7.25
Hong Kong  19.09  5.00  10.00
India  12.78  5.00  8.00
Indonesia  9.14  2.00  2.50
Malaysia  16.65  4.00  9.00
Pakistan  8.96  5.00  5.00
Philippines  8.50  3.00  4.75
Singapore  19.51  4.00  10.00
South Africa  14.32  5.00  6.00
South Korea  14.21  2.00  6.00
Taiwan  17.60  3.00  6.75
Thailand  12.92  2.00  3.25
Turkey  11.82  2.00  4.00
28Table 2: Governance Determinants
The  dependent  variable  is  Governance,  which  is  CLSA's  firm-level  corporate  governance  ranking.
Log(Sales) is Log of Sales in  US$. SalesGR is 3-year average  growth  rate of sales (in US$).  KIS is the
ratio of the 3-year average of fixed capital (property plant and equipment) to sales.  Legality is an index
of legal  and  economic  development  constructed  as  a weighted  average  of Efficiency  of the  Judiciary,
Rule of Law,  Corruption,  Risk of Expropriation,  and Risk  of Contract  Repudiation  (Berkowitz,  et al.,
2002).  Judicial  Efficiency is  from the  International  Country Risk Guide (2000).  Shareholder  Rights is
the  sum  of dummies  identifying  one-share/one-vote,  proxy  by  mail,  unblocked  shares,  cumulative
vote/proportional  representation,  preemptive  rights, oppressed  minority,  and % of shares needed to call
an ESM (La Porta et al.,  1999).  Firm-level  data is for  1999  except for 29 firms whose last available data
is  1998.  All regressions  include a year dummy for firms whose  last available  data is  1998  (not shown.)
T-statistics are in parenthesis,  * **, and ***  indicate significance at  1%, 5%, and 10%  respectively.
_  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Log_Sales)  0.98*  0.63  1.05**  0.67 Log(Sales)  (1.84)  (1.29)  (1.99)  (1.54)
9.98***  7.65***  8.7**  6.7** SalesGR  (2.6)  (2.18)  (2.37)  (2.04)
K/S  -1.48***  -1.29***  -1.35***  -1.48*** K/S__________  (-2.97)  (-3.04)  (-2.98)  (-3.4)
Judicial Efficiency  16  (3.5)  **X(3.5)
2.7***  1.67**  1.9***  0.77 Shareholder Rights  _________  (4.5)  (1.96)  (2.9)  (0.8)
Legality  L.62***  1.55* Legality  __________  (7.35)  (6.7)  _  _  _  _  _
42.5***  19.5***  35.7***  16.9***  26.4*** Intercept  (6.1)  (5.1)  (13.1)  (2.3)  (3.4)
Country Dummies  No  No  No  No  No  Yes
Adjusted RA2  0.06  0.22  0.13  0.23  0.15  0.39
#of Firms  335  374  374  335  335  335
29Table 3: Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation
The dependent  variable  in Panel  A, Tobin's-Q, measures expected  market performance  and is defined  as the
market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by total assets.  The dependent  variable  in Panel B, ROA,
measures  the return  on assets  and is  calculated  as net  income  plus interest  expense divided  by total  assets.
Governance is CLSA's firm-level  corporate governance rankings.  Log(Sales) is the natural  log of total sales.
SalesGR is 3-year average growth rate of sales (in US$).  KIS is the ratio of the 3-year average of fixed capital
(property plant and equipment) to sales.  Firm-level  data is for 1999 except for 29 firms whose last available
data  is  1998.  All regressions  include a year dummy for firms whose last available data is 1998 (not shown.)
T-statistics are in parenthesis,  *,  *, and *  * * indicate significance at  1%,  5%, and  10% respectively.
Panel  A: Dependent  Variable = Tobin 's-Q
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Intercept  1  .569*9*  _
(4.99)__  _  _  _  _  _
Governance  0.011**  0.023***  0.023***  0.025***  0.021***  0.0196***




K/S  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-0.24*** K/S  -o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(4.449*;
Country dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
I-Digit SIC dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted RA2  0.03  0.21  0.30  0.34  0.30  0.33
#of Firms  336  336  336  334  323  333
Panel B: Dependent  Variable = ROA
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Intercept  12.539)
(1.9
Governance  0.08***  0.14***  0.13***  0.13***  0.12***  0.11**
(2.83)  (3.58)  (3.48)  (3.52)  (3.17)  (2.84)
Log(Sales)  -0.26
SalesGR  0°05* (2.13)  _  _  _  _
)  -0.01* K/S  No  (448
Country dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
I-Digit SIC dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted RA2  0.03  0.19  0.25  0.25  0.26  0.28
#of Firns  351  351  351  347  335  346
30Table 4: Corporate Governance, Legalitv  and Firm Valuation
The  dependent  variable,  Tobin's-Q is  defined as  the market value  of equity plus  total liabilities  divided  by
total assets.  Governance is CLSA's firm-level  corporate  governance  rankings.  Legality is  an index  of legal
and  economic  development  constructed  as a weighted average  of Efficiency  of the  Judiciary,  Rule of Law,
Corruption,  Risk of Expropriation,  and  Risk  of Contract  Repudiation  (Berkowitz,  et  al.,  2002).  Judicial
Efficiency is from the  International  Country  Risk Guide (2000).  Shareholder  Rights is the  sum of dummies
identifying  one-share/one-vote,  proxy  by  mail,  unblocked  shares,  cumulative  vote/proportional
representation,  preemptive  rights, oppressed  minority, and % of shares  needed  to call an  ESM  (Shleifer,  et
al.,  1999).  Latin Dummy is equal to  I if the country  is in  Latin America, 0 otherwise.  Firm-level  data is for
1999  except  for 29 firms whose  last available  data is  1998.  All  regressions  include  336 firms,  1-digit  SIC
dummies and  a year  dummy  for firms  whose  last  available  data  is  1998  (not  shown.)  T-statistics  are  in
parenthesis,  *, **, and  *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and  10% respectively.
Panel  A:  (1)  (2)  (3)  |  (4)
Judicial Efficiency  0.02  -0.02  0.22**  0.27**
(0.62)  (-0.53)  (2.14)  (2.61)
Governance  0.019***  0.049***  0.066***
(3.20)  (3.44)  (4.31)
Judicial Efficiency*  Governance  (-2.25)  -0.006***
Latin Dummy  -1.05
____________________________  ~~~~ ~~(-5.62)
AdjustedRA2  0.11  0.13  0.14  0.19
Panel B:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Shareholde  Rights  0.44  -0.02  0.39  0.43* Shareholder Rights  (0.58)  (-0.30)  (1.49)  (1.68)
Govemnance  0.02***  0.05***  0.06***
(3.19)  (2.33)  (2.82)
Shareholder Rights*  Governance  -0.01  -1.84)
Latin Dummy
____________________________  ~~~~ ~~(-6.26)
Adjusted RA2  0.11  0.13  0.14  0.18
Panel C:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Legality  0.47**  0.17  0.08  0.14*
Legality  (2.05)  (0.67)  (1.18)  (1.87)
Governance  0.017***  0.03*  0.06***
Governance_________________  (2.71)  (1.74)  (2.74)
Legality*Governance  -0.00°1  -0.003*
________  _______  _______  ___  ___  ____  __  _______  (-0.92)  (-1.79)
Latin Dummy
_ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _ _  _ _ _  (-6 .1 6  )  -
Adjusted RA2  0.12  0.13  0.13  1  0.18
31Table 5: Corporate Governance, Legality and Firm Performance
The  dependent  variable,  ROA,  measures  the  return  on assets  and  is  calculated  as  net  income  plus  interest
expense divided by total  assets.  Governance is CLSA's finn-level  corporate  governance  rankings.  Legality
is  an  index  of legal  and  economic  development  constructed  as  a  weighted  average  of Efficiency  of the
Judiciary, Rule of Law, Corruption,  Risk of Expropriation,  and Risk of Contract Repudiation  (Berkowitz,  et
al.,  2002).  Judicial  Efficiency is from the International Country Risk Guide (2000).  Shareholder  Rights is the
sum  of  dummies  identifying  one-share/one-vote,  proxy  by  mail,  unblocked  shares,  cumulative
vote/proportional  representation,  preemptive  rights,  oppressed  minority,  and  % of shares  needed to  call  an
ESM  (Shleifer,  et  al.,  1999).  Latin Dummy  is  equal  to  I if the  country  is in  Latin  America,  0 otherwise.
Firm-level  data is for 1999  except for 29 firms whose last available data is  1998.  All regressions  include 348
firms,  1-digit SIC  dummies and a year dummy for firms  whose last  available data  is  1998  (not shown.)  T-
statistics are in parenthesis,  *, *,  and *** indicate  significance at  1%, 5%, and  10% respectively.
Panel A:  (11  (2)  (3)  (4)  |
Judicial  Efficiency  0.39**  0.20  1.2**  0.01**
(1.95)  (0.96)  (1.97)  (2.38)
Governance  0.09***  0.22***  0.31***
(2.87)  (2.67)  (3.56)
Judicial Efficiency*  Governance  (0189)  -0.028**
Latin Dummy  -6.1 (-5.69)
Adjusted RA2  0.12  0.14  0.15  0.20
Panel B:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Shareholder Rights  1.2***  0.95**  1.7  1.8
Shareholder Rights  (3.15)  (2.27)  (1.31)  (1.34)
Governance  0.08***  0.14  0.18*
(2.55)  (1.31)  (1.79)
Shareholder  Rights* Governance  (-0.01  (-0.082)
Latin Dummy (-5.50)
Adjusted RA2  0.14  0.16  0.16  0.20
Panel C:  (1)  _  (2)  (3)  (4)  |
Legality  0.15  -0.03  0.71*  0.98**
(1.22)  (-0.25)  (1.62)  (2.20)
Governance  010***  0.31***  0.43***
(3.14)  (2.47)  (3.31)
Legality*Governance  -0.014*  -76  Y0'251 
(-1.79)  (-2.55)
Latin Dummy  -6.09*
_________  ~~~~~(-6.09)
Adjusted  RA2  0.11  0.14  0.15  0.20
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